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INTRODUCTION
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”),1 aliens who
wish to be admitted to the United States must avoid any
determination of inadmissibility.2 This Comment addresses one
specific ground of inadmissibility, the two-year foreign residency
requirement imposed on former exchange visitors.3 Section 212(e)
of the INA, as currently in force, prohibits certain exchange program
participants4 from applying for permanent resident status,5 temporary
worker visas,6 or business visas7 after completion of an exchange
program, unless the exchange students first return to their home
countries and reside there for at least two years.8
This two-year foreign residency requirement is often a “significant
life hurdle”9 for exchange students.10 For example, after coming to
1. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1524 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
2. The INA contains various grounds of inadmissibility, exclusion, or reasons
why classes of aliens are “ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to
the United States” unless they qualify for a waiver. See id. § 212(a). Aliens may be
considered ineligible for admission based on the following grounds: (1) healthrelated grounds; (2) criminal grounds; (3) security grounds; (4) the likelihood of
becoming a public charge, i.e., receiving financial support from the government; (5)
labor certification grounds; and (6) illegal entry. See id. In addition, an alien must
fit into one of the “statutory categories of immigrant or nonimmigrant.” See STEPHEN
H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 290 (2d ed. 1997)
(providing examples of the types of immigrants and nonimmigrants that fall under
these statutory categories); see also Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)
(defining the classes of nonimmigrant aliens and the term “immigrant”). An
immigrant, or a permanent resident, or green card holder, is an alien who is
admitted lawfully to the United States permanently. See id. § 101(a)(15) (defining
the term “immigrant” as all aliens who do not fall into any of the nonimmigrant
categories). Nonimmigrants, on the other hand, enter the United States for a
limited purpose and for a limited period of time. See id. With a few limited
exceptions, see, e.g., id. § 101(a)(15)(L), nonimmigrant status requires that the alien
maintain “a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning
and who is visiting the United States temporarily.” See id. § 101(a)(15)(B) (defining
temporary business and pleasure nonimmigrant visitor status).
3. Section 212(e) of the Immigration and Nationality Act applies to this ground
of inadmissibility and is titled “Educational Visitor Status; Foreign Residence
Requirement; Waiver.” See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(e).
4. See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (specifying the classes of
exchange students that are inadmissible).
5. See supra note 2 (defining permanent resident, or immigrant, status).
6. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(H) (providing for a
category of nonimmigrant aliens who come to the United States to work temporarily,
or as temporary trainees, and conditioning the granting of H visas to aliens on a
finding that “unemployed persons capable of performing such services or labor
cannot be found in this country . . . for some applicants”).
7. See id. § 101(a)(15)(L) (allowing entry of aliens who come to the United
States to continue rendering services to the same employer for which they worked in
a managerial position provided that the aliens have been employed by their
employers or affiliates for a certain time).
8. See id. § 212(e).
9. Bruce A. Hake, Hardship Waivers for J-1 Physicians, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, Feb.
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the United States as exchange visitors,11 some exchange students
marry U.S. citizens or permanent residents and have children,
especially when the students continue their studies in the United
States after completion of the exchange program.12 Requiring
departure from the United States for two years can result in: the
separation of exchange students from their U.S. citizen or permanent
resident spouses, children, or other relatives; a disruption of the
exchange students’ and spouses’ careers; and financial difficulties for
the exchange students and their spouses.13
The INA provides an exception to the two-year foreign residency
requirement, however, if the exchange visitors can demonstrate that
their departure will cause exceptional hardship upon their U.S.
citizen or permanent resident spouses or children.14 Courts and
administrative agencies apply this hardship exception in a narrow
fashion.15
Moreover, even if the former exchange student
demonstrates exceptional hardship, the United States Information
Agency (“USIA”)16 still may refuse to grant a waiver on the grounds of
1994, at 1, 8 (noting, for example, that physicians often face the most hardship
because of the requirement due to their long periods of medical training which
result in close ties with the United States).
10. The exact number of exchange visitors subject to the two-year foreign
residency requirement is unknown, but it is estimated to be over 100,000. See United
States Information Agency, Exchange Visitor Program (visited Oct. 18, 1998)
<http://www.usia.gov/abtusia/legal/gc-ducs/j_exchange/register/jselect9.htm>
[hereinafter Exchange Visitor Program] (providing information about the Exchange
Visitor Program).
11. Exchange visitors enter the United States after receiving J-1 visas. See
Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(J) (defining J visa visitor as an alien
who maintains his residence abroad with no intent of abandoning it and who is
entering the country as a student, scholar, trainee, teacher, professor, research
assistant, or specialist, with the purposes of studying, teaching, receiving training, or
other similar purposes).
12. One of the reasons why exchange visitors stay after completion of the
funding from the government is to continue their education. After completion of
their exchange programs, former exchange students are allowed to stay in the
United States for further studies towards a degree using personal finances, and
without using government funding, in which case they have an F-1 status. See
Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(F)(i) (designating the F-visa category
for aliens who enter the United States temporarily as bona fide students for pursuing
studies and not prohibiting former exchange students from acquiring such status);
id. § 212(e) (not prohibiting former exchange students from applying for an F-1
visa). Still, even after possessing a visa other than a J-1 visa, former exchange
students remain subject to the two-year foreign residency requirement. See id.
13. See Hake, supra note 9, at 1 (noting that the requirement results in financial
and other difficulties having serious social and personal ramifications).
14. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(e) (granting the Attorney General
authority to issue waivers based on “exceptional hardship”). The exceptional
hardship standard is discussed infra in Part I.B.
15. See infra Part I.B (explaining that the section 212(e) hardship waiver
provision is harshly enforced).
16. The USIA is an independent foreign affairs agency, with posts in 147
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program and policy considerations.17
Part I of this Comment briefly reviews the underlying purposes for
launching exchange programs, and examines the legislative intent of
the two-year foreign residency requirement for exchange students
and the manner in which courts and federal agencies have
interpreted the exceptional hardship provision.
Part II.A
demonstrates how the foreign residency requirement infringes upon
the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens and permanent residents,
and suggests that when balancing the competing interests of students
and their families against governmental interests, governmental
interests should not receive undue deference. Part II.B argues that
section 212(e) of the INA contradicts the numerous concessions
granted to bona fide marriages by other provisions of the INA. Part
II.B suggests that the process of adjudicating hardship waivers under
212(e) requires consent of an additional agency, USIA, and now its
successor, which is not required for other waivers.
Part III
recommends that Congress create a bona fide marriage exception to
the two-year foreign residency requirement imposed on exchange
students.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Exchange Programs and the Two-Year Foreign Residency Requirement
Congress piloted exchange programs18 for foreign students with the
enactment of the United States Information and Educational
Exchange Act of 1948,19 which was supplanted later by the Fulbrightcountries, that conducts a range of informational programs and educational and
cultural activities. See Glenn Robert Lawrence, Are We Exporting Our Legal System?, 41
FED. B. NEWS & J. 672, 673 (1994). The USIA administers exchange programs and,
along with other responsibilities, reviews waivers of the two-year residency
requirement. See generally Exchange Visitor Program, 22 C.F.R. § 514 (1999)
(detailing provisions and requirements for exchange visitors, including the residency
requirement in the nation of origin). As of October 1, 1999, the USIA officially
ceased to exist. The functions of the former agency and its staff members were
transferred to the Department of State. See Ben Barber, USIA Officially Disappears As
Staffers Go To State, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1999, at A12.
17. See infra Part I.A (discussing the policy grounds behind the enactment of the
two-year foreign residency requirement that might cause the USIA to deny waivers).
18. Exchange Visitor Programs, or exchange programs, are educational and
cultural programs in the United States for foreign nationals that also encourage
Americans to participate in similar programs in other countries. See 22 C.F.R. §
514.1(b).
19. United States Information and Educational Exchange (Smith-Mundt) Act of
1948, Pub. L. No. 80-402, 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. (62 Stat. 6) 4, amended by Immigration
and Nationality Act § 402(f), Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, 276 (codified at 22
U.S.C. § 1446), and Exchange Visitors-Immigration Status Act, Pub. L. No. 84-555,
1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. (70 Stat. 241, 241) 289, 289-90 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
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Hays Act of 1961.20 In addition to the goal of strengthening
educational cooperation,21 the exchange programs were intended to
disseminate information about the United States abroad22 and
“interpret the spirit of America to the world.”23 Exchange students
were to assist in this endeavor by sharing their positive impressions of
the United States with family and friends upon returning to their
home countries.24 Congress viewed the promotion of these ideas as
part of a U.S. foreign policy program that was crucial in light of the
“hostile propaganda campaigns directed against democracy, human
welfare, freedom, truth, and the United States” that originated in the
Soviet Union.25 Thus, in return for educational funding from the
U.S. government,26 exchange students became tools of U.S. foreign
policy.27
§ 1182(e) (1994 & Supp. III 1997)), repealed in part by Mutual Educational and
Cultural Exchange (Fulbright-Hays) Act of 1961 § 111(a)(2), Pub. L. No. 87-256, 75
Stat. 527, 538, 610 (codified as amended in scattered titles and sections of the
U.S.C.).
Foreign exchange programs with Latin American countries existed, however, before
1948 as part of an educational and scientific cooperation. For an overview, see S.
REP. NO. 80-811, at 2 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1011, 1012, which reviews
pre-1948 programs that were established after Inter-American conferences in Buenos
Aires in 1936, and Lima in 1938.
20. Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange (Fulbright-Hays) Act of 1961,
Pub. L. No. 87-256, 75 Stat. 527 (codified as amended in scattered titles and sections
of the U.S.C.).
21. See id. § 102, 75 Stat. 527-28 (listing the provision of technical and other
assistance and exchange of information on education and sciences as the second
objective for establishing the programs).
22. See S. REP. NO. 80-811, at 1, reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1011, 1011 (stating
that communicating information about the U.S. was the first purpose of the
Fulbright-Hays Act which continued exchange programs).
23. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1011, 1013 (discussing the political
situation after World War II and noting the need for a public relations program in
the United States).
24. See id. at 4, reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1011, 1014 (concluding that social
communication is an integral part of U.S. foreign policy that can be achieved
through foreign student exchange programs).
25. See id., reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1011, 1014.
26. In 1999, the U.S. government was planning to spend approximately
$199,024,000 on educational and cultural exchange programs that are conducted
through the USIA. See United States Information Agency, USIA Performance Plan
Fiscal Year 1999 (visited Dec. 19, 1998) <http://www.usia.gov/agency/pp99.htm>.
Over 175,000 students from foreign countries visited the United States in 1998 under
the auspices of such programs. See Exchange Visitor Program, supra note 10; see also
United States Information Agency, Letter from Les Jin, General Counsel of the
USIA, to Amy M. Nice, Esq., Chair of the USIA Liaison & Advocacy Committee,
American Immigration Lawyers Association (May 20, 1996) (visited Oct. 29, 1998)
<http://www.usia.gov/abtusia/legal/gc/jexchang/waivers.htm> [hereinafter Letter
from USIA].
27. Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange (Fulbright-Hays) Act, Pub. L. No.
87-256, 75 Stat. 527 (1961) (codified as amended in scattered titles and sections of
the U.S.C.), continued the primary purpose of the exchange programs as a tool of
foreign policy: “[i]n the current struggle for minds of men, no other instrument of
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In 1956, to further support the underlying foreign relations
purpose of the exchange programs, Congress enacted the Exchange
Visitors-Immigration Status Act,28 which prohibited former exchange
students from applying for immigrant29 and H, or temporary worker,30
visas.31 Congress introduced this restriction on the admission of
former exchange students in response to finding that many exchange
students re-entered the United States as immigrants or
nonimmigrants immediately after the expiration of their programs.32
U.S. legislators became concerned that these practices defeated the
original purpose of the exchange programs33 and that the money
foreign policy has such great potential.” H.R. REP. NO. 87-1094, at 2 (1961), reprinted
in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2759, 2759; see also 107 CONG. REC. 11,401 (1961) (statement of
Sen. Fulbright) (pointing out that it was a well established fact that exchange
programs were an important part of U.S. foreign policy). In addition to stating the
foreign policy objectives, the legislative history of the Fulbright-Hays Act stressed
cultural cooperation and praised exchange programs for breaking stereotypes about
cultures. See H.R. REP. NO. 87-1094, at 2, reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2759, 2759-60
(noting that continuing programs of educational and cultural cooperation is crucial
to the social welfare of the United States and the American people); 107 CONG. REC.
11,400 (1961) (statement of Sen. Fulbright) (expressing the sentiment that
exchange programs reduce the “dangers that come from the bad habit of creating
stereotyped inaccurate images of other countries and their peoples”); see also 105
CONG. REC. 1952 (1959) (statement of Rep. Walter) (noting the importance of
exchange programs to the advancement of educational cooperation).
28. Exchange Visitors-Immigration Status Act, Pub. L. No. 84-555, 70 Stat. 241
(1956) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(e) (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
29. An immigrant is a person who is seeking to enter the United States as a
permanent resident, or green-card holder, see supra note 2, as opposed to a
nonimmigrant who is entering the country for a limited purpose and for a limited
period of time. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(15) (1994).
30. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(H) (covering nurses,
agriculture workers, and non-permanent employees except graduate students); see
also supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing persons covered by temporary
worker visas).
31. See Exchange Visitors-Immigration Status Act § 201(b).
32. See S. REP. NO. 84-1608, at 4 (1956), reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2662, 2665.
Prior to the 1956 legislation, exchange students merely were required to depart from
the United States when their exchange programs expired. See id., reprinted in 1956
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2662, 2665. After their departure, however, some former students who
were interested in returning to the United States immediately applied for an
immigrant or another nonimmigrant visa. See id., reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2662, 2665 (noting that according to unofficial sources, five to ten percent of
government-sponsored exchange visitors admitted to the United States in 1955 failed
to return home); see also 102 CONG. REC. 5019 (1956) (statement of Sen. Fulbright)
(commenting that from the very beginning of the program “increasing numbers of
exchange visitors have sought to remain here at the expiration of their authorized
stay, by obtaining immigrant status through one device or another”).
33. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text (noting that the congressional
intent was to have exchange students return to their home country and promote
American ideology); see also S. REP. NO. 84-1608, at 4, reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2662, 2665 (pointing out that the United States is interested in having exchange
students return to their home countries and promote U.S. understanding abroad by
sharing with their friends and family their favorable impressions of the United
States).
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allocated for exchange students’ U.S. education went to waste.34 In
1961, Congress passed the Fulbright–Hays Act,35 which modified the
requirement by mandating that exchange visitors return to their
country of nationality, last residence, or other permitted foreign
country upon completion of the exchange program.36 In 1970,
Congress eliminated the third-country choice,37 and the restriction
became known as the two-year foreign residency requirement.38
The two-year foreign residency requirement under section 212(e)
of the INA39 prohibits certain exchange visitors holding J visas40 from

34. See 102 CONG. REC. 8563 (1956) (statement of Rep. Judd) (“My children do
not get educated at public expense . . . . Why should we bring a lad from another
country and train him at public expense and then take him back in . . . without his
having rendered the service to his own country for which he was given the
training?”).
35. Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange (Fulbright-Hays) Act, Pub. L. No.
87-256, 75 Stat. 527 (1961) (codified as amended in scattered titles and sections of
the U.S.C.).
36. See id. § 109(c). The purpose of this limitation was to prevent visitors from
developing countries from fulfilling the two–year requirement in Canada and not in
the needy country. See H.R. REP. NO. 87-1094, at 16 (1961), reprinted in 1961
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2759, 2774 (stating that the purpose of the two-year requirement is
to prevent an exchange alien from spending his two years in an area other than his
home country).
37. See Immigration and Nationality Act—Entry of Non-immigrants, Pub. L. No.
91-225, § 2, 84 Stat. 116, 116-17 (1970) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(e) (1994 & Supp.
III 1997)) (amending section 212(e) of the INA to eliminate the existing provision
whereby exchange visitors could fulfill the two-year residency requirement in a
permitted foreign country other than that of their nationality or last residence).
38. For a comprehensive review of the legislative and administrative history of
the two-year foreign residency requirement, see generally Scott F. Cooper et al.,
Exchange Visitors, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, Oct. 1993, at 2-4. Also, for a discussion of the
two-year foreign residency requirement, see generally Russell G. Donaldson,
Annotation, Foreign Residence Requirement for Educational (Exchange) Visitors Under §
212(e) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.S. § 1182(e)), 48 A.L.R. FED. 509
(1980 & Supp. 1997).
39. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(e) states:
Provided, that upon the favorable recommendation of the Director [of the
United States Information Agency], pursuant to the request of an interested
U.S. government agency . . ., or of the Commissioner of Immigration and
Naturalization after he has determined that departure from the United
States would impose exceptional hardship upon the alien’s spouse or child
(if such spouse or child is a citizen of the United States or a lawfully resident
alien), . . . the Attorney General may waive the requirement of such two-year
foreign residence abroad . . . .
Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(e). The Code of Federal Regulations
delegates the functions of the Attorney General, with regard to the provisions of
section 212(e) of the INA, to the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization,
who, in turn, delegates those functions to the District Directors of Immigration and
Naturalization. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 2.1, 1031 (1999).
40. Congress established the J visa category exclusively for exchange students
with the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961. See Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961 § 109(b)
(creating the new J visa as a nonimmigrant exchange program visa, which further
simplified the administration of the two year foreign residence requirement).
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applying for H,41 L,42 and immigrant visas,43 unless the exchange
visitors reside in their home country for a minimum of two years after
completing an exchange program in the United States.44 This
requirement is applicable to three groups of exchange visitors:
(1) those whose exchange visit is financed either by the U.S. or the
student’s home government;45 (2) those whose skills appear on the
“skills list”46 compiled by the USIA;47 and (3) those who are foreign
doctors attending graduate medical training in the United States.48
Section 212(e) of the INA provides that exchange students may
obtain a waiver of the two-year foreign residency requirement on one
of four grounds: (1) upon the request of an interested government
agency in the United States; (2) upon a showing of exceptional
hardship to the exchange visitor’s U.S. citizen or permanent resident
spouse or child; (3) when an exchange visitor faces persecution in
her home country; or (4) when the home country of the exchange
visitor does not object to the waiver.49
41. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(H); supra note 6
(explaining H class of nonimmigrant visas).
42. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(L); supra note 7
(describing L class of nonimmigrants).
43. See supra note 2.
44. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(e). An exchange student who
neither fulfills the two-year residency requirement nor obtains a waiver also is
precluded from applying for a K, or fiancée, visa under section 101(a)(15)(K) of
INA. See Friedberger v. Schultz, 616 F. Supp. 1315, 1319 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (upholding
State Department interpretation that former J visa holders may not apply for K visas
on the grounds that the purpose of the K visa is eventually to procure permanent
residence following marriage to a U.S. citizen or permanent resident, whereas the
legislative intent behind section 212(e) of the INA is to preclude former exchange
students from remaining in the United States).
45. This requirement applies regardless of whether the program is fully or
partially, directly or indirectly, financed by either the United States or the
government of the country of the student’s nationality or last residence. See
Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(e); see also 22 C.F.R. § 514.2 (1999) (defining
“financed indirectly” as financing of the program by an organization or institution to
which the United States or the exchange visitor’s government contributes funds).
46. The Exchange Visitor Skills List outlines the fields of knowledge and skills
that are in short supply in countries that send exchange visitors to the United States.
See 22 C.F.R. § 514.44(a)(1)(ii) (citing Exchange Visitor Skills List, 49 Fed. Reg.
24,194 et seq. (1984) (as revised)). The list of both the countries and professions is
updated periodically.
47. See id.
48. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(e) (laying out the three groups
described).
49. See id.
When Congress introduced the two-year foreign residency
requirement in 1956, see supra notes 28-34, the law provided only for a waiver on
public interest grounds. See S. REP. NO. 84-1608, at 5 (1956), reprinted in 1956
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2662, 2664 (“[T]he purpose of the [public interest waiver] is to permit
the Attorney General to waive the 2-year absence requirement in special cases
affecting the public interest, such as those relating to the defense and security of the
United States.”). Nevertheless, private relief bills on the grounds of exceptional
hardship were available, see id., despite the congressional approach to oppose such
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The focus of this Comment is on hardship waivers. The process of
obtaining a hardship waiver of the two-year foreign residency
requirement is expensive and time consuming,50 and the outcome is
always uncertain.51 The procedure for obtaining a hardship waiver of
the foreign residency requirement for exchange visitors52 begins with
the filing of an application with the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (“INS”) regional processing center, including supporting
documentation.53 If the INS finds the claimed hardship exceptional,
it forwards the file to the USIA Exchange Visitor Waiver Review
Board54 because the INS cannot grant a waiver without USIA
concurrence.55 The USIA, in turn, may consult with the program
bills except in “very good” cases. See id. (“[O]ur general policy now is to oppose all
special bills of this kind, with the exception of those cases involving the humanities
where we know there is a very good case.”). In 1970, Congress provided two
additional grounds for waivers: fear of persecution and a no-objection statement
from the exchange student’s home government. See Immigration and Nationality
Act–-Entry of Nonimmigrants, Pub. L. No. 91-225, 84 Stat. 116, 117 (1970) (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(e) (1994 & Supp. III 1997)). Medical students,
however, have not been eligible for a “no objection” waiver since 1976. See Health
Professions Educational Associations Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-484, § 601(c), 90
Stat. 2243, 2301 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(e) (1994 & Supp. III
1997)).
50. See Michael Maggio, Understanding J-1 Visas: When and Why Employers Should
Avoid Them, in 27TH ANNUAL IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION INSTITUTE, at 97, 102
(PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H4-5198, 1994), available
in WESTLAW, 515 PLI/Lit 97 (asserting that all waivers of the two-year foreign
residency requirement are time consuming and costly).
51. Cf. Letter from USIA, supra note 26, at 9, 10 (giving examples of how and why
applications are reviewed on a case-by-case basis). According to the USIA, the
outcomes of individual cases are difficult to predict because although the fact
patterns of some cases may appear identical, the programs, policies, and foreign
relations considerations may differ. See id. Compare Al-Khayyal v. INS, 630 F. Supp.
1162, 1165-67 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (refusing to find exceptional hardship for a U.S.
citizen wife despite the fact that her legal education and career would be interrupted
if she followed her former exchange student husband to Saudi Arabia), aff’d, 818
F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1987), with In re Hersh, 11 I. & N. Dec. 142, 143 (B.I.A. 1965)
(finding exceptional hardship and granting a waiver of the two-year foreign
residency requirement with the decisive factor being that U.S. citizen husband’s
education and medical career would be interrupted should he follow his exchange
student spouse to France).
52. For procedural details on how to obtain a hardship waiver, see generally 22
C.F.R. § 514.44 (1999) and Hake, supra note 9, at 16-27.
53. Applicants commonly submit to the USIA information on the following: the
amount and source of funding received from the U.S. or foreign government; the
general conditions of the applicant’s home country; and the presence of a medical
condition in the U.S. citizen, permanent resident, spouse, or child, coupled with the
lack of adequate medical treatment for that condition in the applicant’s home
country. See Letter from USIA, supra note 26, at 7-8.
54. See 22 C.F.R. § 514.44(b), (g) (specifying procedures through which the INS
forwards files to the USIA Exchange Visitor Waiver Review Board).
55. In Silverman v. Rogers, 437 F.2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970), the court considered
whether the language of section 212(e) of the INA should be read to require a
favorable recommendation of the Director of the USIA when the INS has
determined that the hardship is exceptional, or, alternatively, whether the USIA
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sponsor.56 The USIA often denies a waiver, even if the demonstrated
hardship is exceptional, on the grounds of program and policy
concerns.57 The following section argues that in denying waivers, the
agencies focus on the legislative intent behind establishing exchange
programs.
B. How “Exceptional” Must the Hardship Be to Qualify for a Waiver Under
Section 212(e) of the INA?
1. Legislative intent is to interpret hardship stringently, even in cases of
marriages
To obtain a waiver on the grounds of exceptional hardship to a
U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouse or child, an exchange
student, of course, must be married to a U.S. citizen or permanent
resident, or have a U.S. citizen or permanent resident child, as the
language of the statute commands.58 Many individuals assume that
marrying a U.S. citizen resolves all immigration problems,59 but it
does not. If a U.S. citizen falls in love with and marries an exchange
visitor or former exchange visitor subject to the foreign residency
requirement, the INS and USIA still strictly enforce the residency

concurrence is required only when the waiver is based upon the request of an
interested government agency. See id. at 106. The court held that in light of the
legislative history favoring fewer waivers, it is logical to give more agencies a veto
power, and, therefore, the USIA concurrence is required in both cases. See id. at 10607. Thus, if the INS finds sufficient hardship, it first consults with the USIA and then
grants a waiver only if the USIA concurs. See id. (concluding that both the House and
the Senate intended to include the Secretary of State in the hardship waiver process).
56. See 22 C.F.R. § 514.44(b)(2)(ii) (“If it deems it appropriate, the Agency may
request the views of each of the exchange visitors’ sponsors concerning the waiver
application.”). A program sponsor is a legal entity designated by the USIA to
conduct an exchange program. See id. § 514.2.
57. See, e.g., Dina v. Attorney Gen., 616 F. Supp. 718 (N.D.N.Y. 1985) (stating that
the INS granted a waiver but USIA vetoed it), aff’d, 793 F.2d 473, 477 (2d Cir. 1986)
(per curiam); see also Letter from USIA, supra note 26 (describing policies that USIA
followed in denying waivers).
58. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(e) (1994 &
Supp. III 1997) (stating that the two-year requirement may be waived upon a showing
of exceptional hardship to the alien’s U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouse or
child). See, e.g., Michael Ungar, Circumventing the Two-Year Foreign Residency
Requirement: A Primer, in 27TH ANNUAL IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION INSTITUTE,
at 127 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H4-5198, 1998),
available in WESTLAW, 515 PLI/Lit 117 (noting that only hardship to the U.S.
citizen or permanent resident spouse is considered, and that hardship to the alien
herself is irrelevant).
59. Cf. David Moyce, Comment, Petitioning on Behalf of an Alien Spouse: Due Process
Under the Immigration Laws, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1747, 1749 (1986) (summarizing how
marriage to a U.S. citizen or permanent resident assists an alien seeking admission to
the United States); infra Part II.B.1 (reviewing various concessions in immigration
law intended to preserve family unity).
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requirement and deny waiver of the requirement.60 The legislative
intent behind the exchange programs and the two-year foreign
residency requirement is the main reason why agencies and some
courts refuse to allow exchange students to remain in the United
States with their families.61
When Congress imposed the two-year foreign residency
requirement on exchange program participants in 1956,62 it intended
for the requirement to be implemented stringently, and that
marriage to a U.S. citizen or permanent resident would not by itself
constitute an automatic waiver.63 The related legislative hearings
demonstrate the congressional view at that time: if aliens accept
participation in exchange programs, they must fulfill their
“missionary”64 work by returning home and spreading good word
about the United States.65 Consequently, despite marriage to a U.S.
citizen or permanent resident, exchange students should honor their
obligations created by their participation in an exchange program
and return home for a minimum of two years.66
60. See infra Part I.B.2 (discussing the harsh interpretation of exceptional
hardship standard); infra Part II.B.2 (discussing routine denials by the USIA even if
hardship is present).
61. See Chong v. USIA, 821 F.2d 171, 177 (3d Cir. 1987) (relying on the
legislative history of the two-year foreign residency requirement in denying a
hardship waiver); Silverman v. Rogers, 437 F.2d 102, 106 (1st Cir. 1970) (examining
the legislative history of the requirement and upholding the denial of a waiver);
Letter from USIA, supra note 26, at 9 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 87-721, at 121-22 (1961)
to support the contention that separation from the spouse and child is not by itself
sufficient to grant a hardship waiver and stating that the Waiver Review Branch is
guided by the House report in adjudicating waivers).
62. See Exchange Visitors-Immigration Status Act, Pub. L. No. 84-555, 70 Stat. 241
(1956) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(e) (1994 & Supp. III 1997))
(amending Smith-Mundt Act § 201 and imposing a two-year foreign residency
requirement).
63. See Exchange Visitors-Immigration Status: Hearings on S. 2562 Before the Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 84th Cong. 16 (1956) [hereinafter 1956 Hearings] (statement of
Russell L. Riley, Director of the Department of State’s International Educational
Exchange Service) (urging Congress to enact the two-year foreign residency
requirement with exceptions only in extremely appealing cases of marriages).
64. See id. at 11 (statement of Russell L. Riley, Director of the Department of
State’s International Educational Exchange) (stating that a two-year period is
sufficient enough time for exchange students to fulfill their “missionary” work in
their home country and for the United States to derive benefits from their
experiences here).
65. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text (discussing the purposes for
establishing exchange visitor programs).
66. See 1956 Hearings, supra note 63, at 5 (statement of Sen. Fulbright)
(commenting that exchange visitors accept their appointments freely, understanding
their situation, rather than entering with the intent to stay as immigrants). A few
senators on the Committee on Foreign Relations opposed enforcement of this
requirement in cases involving bona fide marriages of exchange students to U.S.
citizens and permanent residents. See id. at 5 (statement of Sen. Aiken); id. at 15-16
(Remarks of Sen. Wiley).
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When Congress later introduced hardship waivers in 1961,67 it still
intended for the term “exceptional hardship” to cover only the most
First, the senators expressed concern that the law would result in discrimination.
See id. at 5 (statement of Sen. Aiken). Aliens who established ties with the United
States, during and after their exchange programs, by starting families in the United
States would have to wait two years before applying for immigrant and some
nonimmigrant visas, whereas aliens having no ties to the United States would be
eligible to apply for visas. See id. at 5 (statement of Sen. Aiken) (opposing
application of the two-year foreign residency requirement to aliens married to U.S.
citizens or permanent residents). The concern over discrimination proved itself
later: a mail-order bride, for example, can immigrate to the United States quickly,
whereas former exchange students with U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouses
or children must leave the United States to help Congress pursue foreign policy
interests. Compare, e.g., Christine S.Y. Chun, Comment, The Mail-Order Bride Industry:
The Perpetuation of Transnational Economic Inequalities and Stereotypes, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L
ECON. L. 1155, 1166-67 (1996) (describing how foreign women obtain fiancée visas
to travel to the United States after being selected by American consumer-husbands
from a bridal agency catalogue and after the prospective husbands meet the selected
women once), and Eddy Meng, Note, Mail-Order Brides: Gilded Prostitution and the
Legal Response, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 197, 205-09 (1994) (illustrating a typical mailorder bride transaction), with Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(e), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(e) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (requiring a former exchange student married to a
U.S. citizen or permanent resident to show exceptional hardship to the spouse and
obtain the concurrence by the USIA before being able to stay in the United States
with her family).
Second, the senators were concerned that the two-year foreign residency
requirement would cause the undesirable effect of “brain drain” from the United
States. See 1956 Hearings, supra note 63, at 18 (statement of Sen. Aiken) (expressing
concern that educated visitors may opt to live in another country because the U.S.
forces them to leave). Section 212(e) of the INA forces highly qualified and carefully
selected exchange students to leave the U.S., whereas the immigration system often
welcomes less qualified immigrants. Cf. Hiroshi Motomura, The Family and
Immigration: A Roadmap for the Ruritanian Lawmaker, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 511, 539
(1995) (citing to a study suggesting that the current preference of the U.S.
immigration system for family immigration has caused immigrants’ skill levels to
decline). Exchange students subject to the two-year foreign residency requirement
may choose Canada or another developed country as their permanent place of
residence if they do not wish to return home, causing the United States to lose the
benefit of their training. See 1956 Hearings, supra note 63, at 19 (statement of Sen.
Aiken) (“We gave them the training and Canada gets them as citizens.”).
Third, the senators expressed concern that through the foreign residency
requirement, the United States pronounces that foreign policy interests are more
important than family unity. See id. at 17 (statement of Sen. Wiley) (condemning the
“missionary” policy for its effect of splitting up families). This foreign policy, in turn,
results in negative publicity for the country, see id. (anticipating the negative
perception of the United States likely to arise in parents of a girl who married in this
country but was still deported), and defeats the program’s goal to “interpret the
spirit of America to the world.” Id. (stating that the “missionary” policy creates “bad
blood” between the United States and other countries, rather than creating a good
reputation for the United States); supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text
(describing the programs’ goals). For a further discussion on how the two-year
foreign residency requirement dishonors family unity, see infra Part II.A.1, which
discusses the constitutional right to family unity and how the two-year foreign
residency requirement dishonors it.
67. See Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange (Fulbright-Hays) Act of 1961,
Pub. L. No. 87-256, § 109, 75 Stat. 527, 535 (codified as amended in scattered titles
and sections of U.S.C.) (authorizing the Attorney General to waive the two-year
requirement upon a showing of exceptional hardship).
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extreme hardship cases.68 As the House Report notes:
It is believed to be detrimental to the purposes of the program and
to the national interests of the countries concerned to apply a
lenient policy in the adjudication of waivers including cases where
marriage occurring in the United States, or the birth of a child or children,
is used to support the contention that the exchange alien’s departure . . .
69
would cause personal hardship.

2. Case law and administrative decisions interpreting the “exceptional
hardship” standard
Complying with the congressional intent to minimize the number
of waivers granted,70 courts and administrative agencies71 usually apply
the hardship test using two prongs, both of which the applicant must
satisfy even though section 212(e) on its face does not command the
two-prong application.72
First, the applicant must show that
exceptional hardship will result if the U.S. citizen or permanent
resident spouse or child remains in the United States during the two
years that the exchange student spends in her home country fulfilling
the foreign residency requirement.73 Second, the applicant must
show that exceptional hardship will result if the U.S. citizen or
permanent resident spouse or child follows the exchange student and
moves to the foreign country for two years.74
Courts and
68. See H.R. REP. NO. 87-721, at 121 (1961) (suggesting new waiver provisions but
emphasizing diligent and strict enforcement of the foreign residency requirement
and a no-leniency policy).
69. Id.
70. Cf. Silverman v. Rogers, 437 F.2d 102, 107 (1st Cir. 1970) (concluding that
USIA concurrence is required because to hold otherwise would increase the number
of waivers granted, and thus, violate legislative intent).
71. See supra text accompanying notes 52-57 (reviewing the procedures for
obtaining a hardship waiver). An examination of extreme hardship cases reveals that
few cases are reported. Waiver denials by the USIA Exchange Visitor Waiver Review
Board, the major impediment to the waiver adjudication process, are not published.
Cf. Letter from USIA, supra note 26, at 10 (commenting on the efforts of the
American Immigration Lawyers Association to establish a databank of exchange
visitors’ waiver information).
72. See, e.g., Al-Khayyal v. INS, 818 F.2d 827, 830 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding under
the two-prong analysis that the U.S. citizen spouse would suffer financial hardship if
she remained in the United States, and her career would be disrupted if she moved
to Saudi Arabia for two years); In re Duchneskie, 11 I. & N. Dec. 583 (B.I.A. 1966)
(using a two-prong test to analyze the hardship waiver, first considering whether
hardship would exist if the U.S. citizen husband and three U.S. citizen children
remained in the U.S., and second, determining whether hardship would result if they
moved to the Philippines while the former exchange student fulfilled the two-year
foreign residency requirement).
73. See Duchneskie, 11 I. & N. Dec. at 583 (analyzing whether the exchange visitor
demonstrated that her U.S. citizen spouse would suffer exceptional hardship if she
left the United States for two years).
74. See id. (examining whether an exchange visitor showed that exceptional
hardship would result to her U.S. citizen children and U.S. citizen husband if they
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administrative agencies find that the stringent interpretation of the
statute assures that waivers are granted only when hardship is truly
exceptional and heartbreaking.75
Applying the first prong of the hardship test, the court in Gras v.
Beechie76 relied on the 1961 House Report77 and held that separation
from a U.S. citizen spouse and two children is insufficient hardship to
qualify an exchange student for a waiver under the statute.78 In Gras,
the plaintiff’s U.S. citizen wife and two U.S. citizen children could not
followed her abroad for two years).
75. See id. (finding hardship and granting a waiver when the exchange student’s
U.S. citizen spouse and their children would otherwise face a range of difficulties).
In Chen v. Attorney Gen., 546 F. Supp. 1060 (D.D.C. 1982), however, the court found
the two-prong test to be inconsistent with the legislative history of the statute. See id.
at 1067. The court in Chen pointed out that section 212(e) of the INA is unclear as
to whether it is the departure of the alien alone, or with his family, that must be
examined to determine whether a level of hardship sufficient to justify a waiver will
result. See id. Specifically, the court cited to the House report which stated that it
would be detrimental “to apply a lenient [waiver] policy . . . including cases where
marriage . . . is used to support the contention that the exchange alien’s departure from
this country would cause personal hardship.” Id. at 1067 (emphasis in original in part and
added in part) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 87-721, at 121 (1961)). Thus, stressing the
words “exchange alien’s departure,” the court in Chen concluded that Congress
intended to take into account only an alien’s, and not a U.S. citizen’s, departure, and
further found irrelevant that hardship would not result if the U.S. citizen remains in
the United States. See id. at 1068. The two-prong application of the statute
potentially violates the constitutional right of U.S. citizens to reside in the United
States. See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing U.S. citizens’ right to reside in the United
States and how it is infringed upon by interpreting the statute as requiring
application of the two-prong test).
76. 221 F. Supp. 422 (S.D. Tex. 1963).
77. See id. at 424 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 87-721, at 121 (1961)).
78. See id.; accord Silverman v. Rogers, 437 F.2d 102, 107 (1st Cir. 1970) (stating
that mere separation of spouses is not a source of hardship); Mendez v. Major, 340
F.2d 128, 131-32 (8th Cir. 1965) (stating that Congress has the power to determine
the conditions under which an alien may be admitted to the United States, even
though the conditions may impose a certain amount of hardship on the alien’s
family); Talavera v. Pederson, 334 F.2d 52, 58 (6th Cir. 1964) (finding that
exceptional hardship standard entails more than normal personal hardship); In re
Bridges, 11 I. & N. Dec. 506, 507 (B.I.A. 1965) (“Temporary separation is a problem
many families face in life and, in and of itself does not represent exceptional
hardship . . . .”) (citation omitted); In re Mansour, 11 I. & N. Dec. 306, 307 (B.I.A.
1965) (same). But see Chen, 546 F. Supp. at 1064 (stressing that courts find hardship
when it is imposed upon both the U.S. citizen spouse and child); In re Nassiri, 12 I. &
N. Dec. 756, 757 (B.I.A. 1968) (granting a waiver on the ground that separation from
both spouse and child is sufficient hardship due to difficulties that the child would
experience from the separation or in the foreign culture). In denying hardship
waivers, courts and agencies have used the language of the 1961 House Report
indicating that a lenient policy of granting hardship waivers in cases of marriages is
detrimental to the purposes of the exchange programs. See, e.g., Nayak v. Vance, 463
F. Supp. 244 (D.S.C. 1978) (holding that a lenient waiver policy is not intended
under the statute). Courts are not sympathetic to waiver applications that are based
on hardship claims resulting from spouse separation because to hold otherwise
would constitute lenient application of the statute and violate legislative intent. See,
e.g., Talavera, 334 F.2d at 58 (stressing the House Report’s emphasis on the need for
“a most diligent and stringent enforcement” of the foreign residency requirement).
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follow him to Argentina for two years because of the children’s
medical conditions.79 In evaluating what hardships would result if the
plaintiff were required to comply with the requirement, the court
found that the plaintiff’s family would not encounter any financial
difficulties by maintaining two households during the two-year
separation because the plaintiff and his wife both earned high
salaries.80 Therefore, the difficulty of living apart for two years
constituted a mere separation, not a ground for an exceptional
hardship waiver.81 The court also noted that because the more
seriously ill of the two children already had undergone the required
operation a year earlier, the continued presence of the father was not
necessary.82 Thus, the court upheld the INS’ order of deportation of
the former exchange student because he had not yet fulfilled his
“missionary”83
two-year
foreign
residency
requirement.84
In the application of the first prong of the hardship waiver test,
other adjudicators have held similarly, finding that the separation of
families by itself never will qualify as exceptional hardship because
temporary separation from a spouse is a problem that many families
face.85
Consequently, the hardship waiver applicant must
demonstrate additional factors beyond family separation to prove
that exceptional hardship to her U.S. citizen or permanent resident
spouse or child will result if that spouse or child remains in the
United States during the two-year separation.86 For example, courts
usually consider insufficiency of funds to support two households as a
significant factor in finding hardship for a U.S. citizen or permanent
resident spouse or child.87 Among other factors, courts also have
79. See Gras, 221 F. Supp. at 424 (discussing that the alien’s children’s physical
condition called for expert medical attention which was not available elsewhere).
80. See id. (stating that because the alien’s wife, a biochemist, could find
employment readily in the United States and the alien, an anesthetist, probably
could obtain a high salary in Argentina, no financial hardship would result from
maintaining two households).
81. See id. (explaining that the alleged hardship is a forced separation of the
exchange visitor from his family and is not grounds for a waiver).
82. See id.
83. See 1956 Hearings, supra note 63, at 5 (statement of Sen. Fulbright).
84. See Gras, 221 F. Supp. at 424.
85. See, e.g., In re Bridges, 11 I. & N. Dec. 506, 507 (B.I.A. 1965) (stating that
many families face temporary separation in life, which means separation alone is not
an exceptional hardship); In re Mansour, 11 I. & N. Dec. 306, 307 (B.I.A. 1965)
(noting that the decision of the U.S. citizen spouse to remain in the United States
while the alien fulfills the two-year foreign residency requirement is self-imposed and
does not constitute hardship).
86. See supra note 78 (citing cases finding that mere separation of family
members does not constitute sufficient hardship).
87. See, e.g., In re Nassiri, 12 I. & N. Dec. 756, 757 (B.I.A. 1968) (concluding that
hardship exists when a former exchange student, forced to return to Iran for two
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found that the well-documented weak physical or emotional health of
the U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouse, or relative of that
spouse satisfies the first prong of the hardship waiver test.88
After the waiver applicant demonstrates that exceptional hardship
will result if the U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouse or child
remains in the United States, he also must meet the second prong of
the test by showing that extreme hardship will result if the spouse
follows the alien spouse and moves to his home country for two
years.89 In general, the following factors support a finding of
exceptional hardship under the second prong: a disruption in
career;90 danger to the physical health of the spouse or child;91 the
presence of a medical condition in the citizen child requiring
advanced medical facilities;92 a lack of educational opportunities;93
and the existence of particularly inhospitable conditions in the
exchange visitor’s home country.94 Under both prongs of the
hardship waiver test, however, it is the totality of the circumstances,
years, would be unable to contribute enough money to support a second
household); In re Duchneskie, 11 I. & N. Dec. 583, 583-84 (B.I.A. 1966) (finding
exceptional hardship on similar facts); In re Habib, 11 I. & N. Dec. 464, 464-65 (B.I.A.
1965) (same); In re Davoudlarian, 11 I. & N. Dec. 300, 301 (B.I.A. 1965) (same).
This approach, however, is disadvantageous for married couples in which both
spouses are professionals with high salaries. See, e.g., Gras, 221 F. Supp. at 424
(denying a waiver to an alien because the family consisted of an anesthetist and a
biochemist, both well-paying jobs, and thus, the family would not face a financial
burden in maintaining two households).
88. See In re Kawasaki, 12 I. & N. Dec. 864, 864-65 (B.I.A. 1968) (finding
exceptional hardship when, among other factors, the departure of the exchange
student would cause great mental anguish to the citizen spouse).
89. See, e.g., Mansour, 11 I. & N. Dec. at 307 (considering what hardship the U.S.
citizen spouse would experience if she moved to Egypt for two years with her
exchange student spouse).
90. See Slyper v. Attorney Gen., 576 F. Supp. 559, 560 (D.D.C. 1983) (finding
hardship when professional career of a research chemist would be disrupted as a
result of her departure abroad); In re Bass, 11 I. & N. Dec. 512, 512-13 (B.I.A. 1966)
(finding hardship when a recent law school graduate was hired in the United States
at the yearly salary of $5,800 and would be unable to practice law in Brazil).
91. See In re Ibarra, 13 I. & N. Dec. 277 (B.I.A. 1969) (granting a waiver when one
of the factors was the medical condition of the citizen wife who experienced fevers,
allergies, rashes and sore limbs during her prior trip to the alien’s country); In re
Ambe, 13 I. & N. Dec. 3 (B.I.A. 1968) (finding that hardship would result to a U.S.
citizen child if she accompanied her parent to India because she would be
susceptible to smallpox).
92. See In re Santillano, 11 I. & N. Dec. 146, 146 (B.I.A. 1965) (finding hardship
when the couple’s child had a congenital defect requiring delicate surgery available
only in the United States).
93. See In re Hersh, 11 I. & N. Dec. 142, 142 (B.I.A. 1965) (considering the
disruption to a U.S. citizen spouse’s education as a factor among others creating
exceptional hardship).
94. See Younghee Na Huck v. Attorney Gen., 676 F. Supp. 10, 13 n.4 (D.D.C.
1987) (finding hardship when the exchange student and U.S. citizen spouse were an
interracial couple and would be subject to discrimination and possible violence in
the exchange student’s home country).
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and not one specific factor, that leads to a finding of exceptional
hardship.95
In applying both prongs of the test for hardship, courts are
reluctant to consider hardship to the U.S. citizen child of an
exchange visitor if both of the child’s parents are aliens.96 For
example, in Nayak v. Vance,97 Dr. Nayak, a medical school graduate,
and his alien wife applied for a hardship waiver of the two-year
foreign residency requirement upon completion of his fourth year of
residency.98 The plaintiffs argued that they satisfied the first prong of
the hardship test because if they left their U.S. citizen child in the
United States, the child would have to be put up for adoption.99 The
plaintiffs further argued that they also satisfied the second prong
because requiring the U.S. citizen child to move abroad would
impose an exceptional hardship upon the child.100 Dr. Nayak’s child
had a rare skin disease and his home country was unable to provide
the appropriate treatment needed for the disease.101 Nevertheless,
the court denied the parents a hardship waiver, stating that “Congress
did not give [a U.S. citizen] child the ability to confer immigration
benefits upon his parents.”102 The court further noted that the citizen
infant’s right to live in the United States is only theoretical, and if the
child later chooses to live in the United States, he may do so if he
makes the choice after living in the parents’ home country.103 Thus,
95. See, e.g., Slyper, 576 F. Supp. at 560 (reversing the district director’s
consideration of factors in isolation and not in the totality of the circumstances).
96. See, e.g., Perdido v. INS, 420 F.2d 1179, 1181 (5th Cir. 1969) (affirming the
denial of a waiver when the application for a waiver was based on hardships to a U.S.
citizen child and both parents were aliens). An exchange student can bring his alien
spouse to the United States on a J-2 visa. Cf. 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(c)(4) (1999) (providing
that a spouse or child accompanying an exchange student is also subject to the twoyear foreign residency requirement). If the couple has a child during their stay in
the United States, the child is a U.S. citizen by birth. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
(“All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”).
97. 463 F. Supp. 244 (D.S.C. 1978).
98. See id. at 245.
99. See id. at 246 (arguing that the couple’s child will suffer neglect or be placed
for adoption by strangers unless the court grants a waiver).
100. See id. (arguing that the plaintiffs satisfied the second prong of the test
because deportation would result in extreme hardship to the U.S. citizen child who
would be unable to receive treatment for a rare skin disease and because the child
needs parents able to understand his heritage).
101. See id. at 250 (describing how treatment for the child’s rare skin disease is not
available in India).
102. Id. at 248 (quoting Perdido v. INS, 420 F.2d 1179, 1181 (5th Cir. 1969)).
103. See id.; see also Mendez v. Major, 340 F.2d 128, 132 (8th Cir. 1965) (denying
immigration benefits to two Mexican nationals, both J visa holders, who have a U.S.
citizen child). Courts have upheld the constitutionality of this practice. See Acosta v.
Gaffney, 558 F.2d 1153, 1158 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding that the right of an infant
citizen to choose his residence is not violated by the parents’ deportation because an
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the court rendered the language of section 212(e), which allows a
waiver on the grounds of exceptional hardship to a U.S. citizen or
permanent resident child, virtually meaningless.
Even if the exchange visitor satisfies both prongs of the test, the
USIA Waiver Review Branch, whose concurrence is required,104
routinely denies waivers, and is the major impediment in the
process.105 In denying waivers, the USIA takes the position that
program and policy considerations outweigh exceptional hardship to
an exchange student’s U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouse or
children.106 Furthermore, USIA denials of waivers are not subject to
judicial review.107 The result of the stringent application of the statute
is the separation of families and the de facto deportation of a U.S.
citizen spouse or child. Such results threaten the constitutionality of
section 212(e).
II. ANALYSIS
A. Potential Unconstitutionality of Section 212(e) of the INA
Consistent with the expressed congressional purpose that
exchange students are to “interpret the spirit of America to the
world”108 upon return to their home countries, section 212(e) of the
infant is not capable of exercising the right). For a review of the constitutional rights
of U.S. citizen children born to alien parents who are under deportation
proceedings, see generally Edith Z. Friedler, From Extreme Hardship to Extreme Deference:
United States Deportation of Its Own Children, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 491, 492 (1995),
which analyzes whether deportation of alien parents violates due process and equal
protection rights of U.S. citizen children, and also whether the deportation results in
an unconstitutional de facto deportation of the U.S. citizen child.
104. See Silverman v. Rogers, 437 F.2d 102, 107 (1st Cir. 1970) (construing section
212(e) of the INA, which on its face does not require the USIA concurrence in
hardship waiver cases, as still giving the agency a veto power).
105. See, e.g., Singh v. Moyer, 867 F.2d 1035, 1037 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that the
INS Regional Commissioner found the existence of exceptional hardship, but the
USIA nevertheless denied a waiver); Chong v. USIA, 821 F.2d 171, 174 (same); Hake,
supra note 9, at 2 (suggesting that even if the case amounts to extreme hardship, the
USIA position is not predictable).
106. See Maggio, supra note 50, at 105 (stating that the USIA concurs in a hardship
waiver only if the hardship is truly heartbreaking); supra Part I.A (discussing that in
establishing exchange programs, Congress was predominantly guided by foreign
policy considerations).
107. See Singh, 867 F.2d at 1038 (concluding that no meaningful standard exists
for courts to review USIA denial of waivers properly); see also Slyper v. Attorney Gen.,
827 F.2d 821, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that USIA decisions are subject to review
only in cases involving constitutional, statutory, or regulatory violations, fraud, or
lack of jurisdiction), cert. denied sub nom., Slyper v. Meese, 485 U.S. 941 (1988);
Abdelhamid v. Ilchert, 774 F.2d 1447, 1450 (9th Cir. 1985) (ruling that USIA’s
regulations raise no legal issues for judicial review).
108. See S. REP. NO. 80-811, at 3 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1011, 1013
(discussing the importance of the exchange programs in light of increased anti-
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INA109 prohibits all exchange visitors, including those married to U.S.
citizens or permanent residents, from remaining in the United States
as immigrants or certain nonimmigrants, absent special
circumstances.110 Any constitutional challenge to this requirement by
an exchange student will fail because aliens have no right of entry to
this country.111 The two-year foreign residency requirement imposed
on exchange students who are married to U.S. citizens or permanent
residents, however, does not involve solely the rights of these
exchange students, but also involves the rights of their U.S. citizen or
permanent resident spouses or children. The requirement leaves
only two choices for a U.S. citizen or permanent resident who is
married to an exchange student: live separated from the spouse for
two years or move to a foreign country.
This Part argues that section 212(e) of the INA fails to satisfy the
constitutional protections for family unity pronounced by the United
States Supreme Court. In addition, the two-year foreign residency
requirement intrudes upon a U.S. citizen’s constitutional right to
reside in the United States. This Part suggests that the foreign policy
goals served by exchange programs are outdated, and the foreign
residency requirement provision fails the strict scrutiny test. This
Part also argues that the foreign residency requirement is
inconsistent with immigration law preferences for family unity.
Lastly, this Part argues that the USIA waiver adjudication process is
inconsistent with the processing of other hardship waivers.
1.

A fundamental right to family unity
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the importance of family
unity in Moore v. City of East Cleveland.112 In Moore, the Court extended
the substantive due process right to live together as a family not only
to the nuclear family, but also to the extended family.113 The Court
American propaganda from the Soviet Union).
109. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(e) (1994 & Supp.
III 1997)).
110. See id. (outlining the two-year foreign residency requirement for J-1 visas and
the conditions needed for waiver of that requirement).
111. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972) (citing to the
congressional plenary power to exclude aliens and upholding denial of entry to a
Belgian communist). The alien has neither the right to reside in the United States,
see id. at 765, nor the right to family unity as protected by the United States
Constitution. See David Moyce, Comment, Petitioning on Behalf of an Alien Spouse: Due
Process Under the Immigration Laws, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1747, 1759 (1986) (stating that
although some court decisions seem to afford more attention to due process rights of
aliens, such rights have not been recognized generally).
112. 431 U.S. 494, 505-06 (1977) (plurality opinion) (striking down a zoning
ordinance that defined family via limited categories of related individuals).
113. See id. at 506 (holding that an ordinance that forced children and adults to
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noted that the Constitution protects the institution of the family
because it is deeply rooted in American history and tradition.114 In a
later case, Lyng v. Castillo,115 the Court elaborated that to constitute an
infringement on the right to keep family together, the statute needs
to “directly and substantially interfere with family living
arrangements.”116
When applied to exchange visitors who are married to U.S. citizens
and permanent residents, the foreign residency requirement fails the
standards delineated in Moore and Lyng. The two-year foreign
residency requirement is imposed even on exchange students who
enter bona fide marriages with U.S. citizens and permanent
residents.117 Despite the Supreme Court’s declaration that family
unity is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution,118 in the
context of section 212(e), Congress commands the separation of
families119 to further the government’s interest in having exchange
students fulfill their “missionary” foreign policy work.120 Thus, under
the guise of foreign policy, section 212(e) of the INA interferes with
the fundamental right to family unity afforded to U.S. citizens and
permanent residents. Furthermore, applying the Lyng test, section
212(e) directly and substantially interferes with family living
arrangements by not allowing the alien spouse to live together with
the U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouse. Thus, under Lyng,
denial of a section 212(e) hardship waiver amounts to an
infringement of the right to keep family together.
2.

U.S. citizens’ right to reside in the United States
In cases that involve an exchange student who seeks a hardship
waiver and is married to a U.S. citizen, section 212(e) of the INA
potentially infringes upon the U.S. citizen’s right to live in the United
live in narrowly-defined family patterns violated the Due Process Clause).
114. See id. at 503.
115. 477 U.S. 635 (1986).
116. See id. at 638 (upholding a federal law that provided food stamps to
households rather than to individuals on the ground that the law did not interfere
with the family choice whether to live and dine together).
117. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(e) (1994 &
Supp. III 1997)) (providing for a waiver in cases involving marriage to a U.S. citizen
or permanent resident only upon a showing of exceptional hardship to the alien’s
U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouse or child).
118. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 503.
119. See, e.g., Gras v. Beechie, 221 F. Supp. 422 (S.D. Tex. 1963) (highlighting the
legislative intent that separation from the spouse and child alone will never satisfy
the hardship standard).
120. See 1956 Hearings, supra note 63, at 3 (statement of Sen. Fulbright) (stressing
the main purpose of the two-year foreign residency requirement is to make foreign
exchange students return home in order to promote the American spirit).
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States. A U.S. citizen has a constitutional right to reside in this
country,121 and courts have referred to this right as both
fundamental122 and “undisputed.”123 But in the context of the
exceptional hardship waiver, this right is no longer undisputed
because courts and agencies now apply the two-prong hardship
waiver test.124 If an agency or court finds under the first prong that
exceptional hardship will result to the U.S. citizen spouse if he
remains in the United States while the exchange student fulfills the
two-year foreign residency requirement, the courts still do not grant
the waiver.125 Instead, the adjudicator further considers under the
second prong whether the hardship can be avoided if the U.S. citizen
spouse follows the exchange student and moves abroad for two
years.126 By considering what hardships would result to the U.S.
citizen spouse or child should he move abroad, the agencies ignore
the fundamental right of U.S. citizens to reside in this country.
Consequently, the U.S. citizen who wishes to remain with his spouse,
and thereby exercise his right to family unity, has to give up his
fundamental right to live in the United States.
3.

Balancing interests at stake
Section 212(e) of the INA infringes upon the fundamental right of
U.S. citizens and permanent residents to family unity, and the
fundamental right of U.S. citizens to reside in the United States.
Government regulations that burden fundamental rights must meet
the strict scrutiny test,127 under which the government must present a
compelling interest and demonstrate that the law is closely tailored to
effectuate only that interest.128 Thus, the two-year foreign residency

121. The constitutional right to reside in the United States stems from the
concept of citizenship. See Friedler, supra note 103, at 530-31 & 531 n.280 (stating
that U.S. citizens enjoy the right to remain in the country).
122. See Nayak v. Vance, 463 F. Supp. 244, 247 (D.S.C. 1978) (recognizing the
fundamental constitutional right of a U.S. citizen to live in the United States but
refusing to allow alien parents of a U.S. citizen child to remain in the country).
123. See Perdido v. INS, 420 F.2d 1179, 1181 (5th Cir. 1969) (stating that U.S.
citizens have an undisputed right to remain in this country, but minor U.S. citizen
children cannot confer immigration benefits upon their parents).
124. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text (discussing that agencies and
courts apply the section 212(e) waiver provision under a two-prong test).
125. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text; see also supra note 75 (discussing
that the two-prong test approach to waivers is inconsistent with the legislative history
of section 212(e) of the INA).
127. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(establishing that different constitutional claims must be subjected to different levels
of scrutiny).
128. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986) (“Under strict
scrutiny the means chosen to accomplish the State’s asserted purpose must be
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requirement can be upheld only if the government has a compelling
interest to institute and sponsor exchange programs, and if the
interest outweighs U.S. citizens’ and permanent residents’ right to
family unity and the right of citizens to reside in the United States.
When the exchange programs were instituted, the government’s
interests were to promote and interpret the American spirit to the
world,129 in light of the anti-American propaganda that originated in
the Soviet Union,130 with the supplemental purpose of educational
cooperation with other countries.131 The courts that previously found
the interests compelling and upheld the constitutionality of section
212(e) did so by examining the legislative history of the statutes, and
thus, international political climate of 1956 and 1961 that affected
and influenced Congress when it enacted the two-year foreign
residency requirement and introduced the hardship waiver.132 In the
late 1980s and early 1990s, however, the international political
climate changed.133 The Soviet Union fell apart134 and the Cold War
ended.135 Since that time, the changed world order has undermined
specifically and narrowly tailored to accomplish that purpose.”); Note, The
Constitutionality of the INS Sham Marriage Investigation Policy, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1238,
1244 (1986) (asserting that INS marital investigation procedures are unconstitutional
because they are poorly tailored to serve their intended purpose of preventing
immigration marriage fraud) (quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388
(1978)); cf. Gras v. Beechie, 221 F. Supp. 422, 424 (S.D. Tex. 1963) (stating that the
term “exceptional hardship” can only be understood in the context of interest
balancing).
129. See S. REP. NO. 80-811, at 3 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1011, 1012;
see also supra notes 22-25 (discussing the foreign policy objectives behind exchange
programs).
130. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text (describing the legislative intent
for instituting exchange programs).
131. See supra note 27 (reviewing the supplemental legislative purpose of the
Fulbright Act of 1961 to continue cultural and educational cooperation).
132. See Silverman v. Rogers, 437 F.2d 102, 107 (1st Cir. 1970); Nayak v. Vance,
463 F. Supp. 244, 249 (D.S.C. 1978); Gras, 221 F. Supp. at 424 (balancing the
competing interests of the permanent resident spouse and U.S. citizen children
against those of the government and finding in favor of the government).
133. Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet premier, announced that the Soviet Union
would no longer force Eastern block countries to remain Communist, resulting in
the discreditation of Soviet-style Communism. See 2 JOHN A. GARRATY, THE AMERICAN
NATION, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1865 (Lauren Silverman & Bruce
Borland eds., 7th ed. 1991).
134. See COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES ACCORD, Dec. 8, 1991
(translation by author) (on file with author) (“We, the Republic of Belarus, the
Russian Federation (RSFSR), and the Ukraine, in our capacity as the founder-states
of the USSR which signed the 1922 Union Treaty, . . . declare that the USSR, as a
subject of international law and geopolitical reality, no longer exists.”).
135. See GARRATY, supra note 133, at 937 (“Soviet attack anywhere on the continent
was unthinkable. The cold war was over at last.”); see also Francis A. Gabor, Reflections
on the Freedom of Movement in Light of the Dismantled “Iron Curtain,” 65 TUL. L. REV. 849,
854 (1991) (reviewing the events of 1988 when a series of democratic revolutions
took place in Eastern Europe).
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the importance of U.S. government interests in dispelling Soviet
propaganda. Consequently, the government’s interest in returning
exchange students to their home countries is lessened and is no
longer compelling. Thus, section 212(e) of the INA is no longer
closely tailored to foreign policy objectives because the objectives
themselves are outdated, and the provision fails the strict scrutiny
test. Therefore, Congress should reconsider the applicability of the
two-year foreign residency requirement, especially to those exchange
students who are married to U.S. citizens and permanent residents.136
Although the rights of U.S. citizens are involved, the courts might
defer to the legislature on this issue because Congress enjoys the
absolute power to exclude aliens.137 For example, in Kleindienst v.
Mandel,138 American plaintiffs argued that their First Amendment
rights were violated because a Belgian Communist was denied entry
as a nonimmigrant when he was invited to speak at universities.139
The Court employed an extremely deferential standard of review,
stating that Congress enjoys the plenary power to legislate on the
admission of aliens and the exclusion of aliens who do not meet
certain characteristics.140 The reason for denying admission to the
Belgian Communist was the desire to keep certain ideas out of the
country.141 Finding the reason for the statute and visa denial facially
legitimate and bona fide, the Court upheld the statute and the visa
denial.142 In the case of the two-year foreign residency requirement,
however, the statute fails even the Kleindienst standard because the
reason for the requirement is outdated, and thus, no longer
legitimate.
B. Inconsistency of Section 212(e) with Immigration Law
An examination of section 212(e) of the INA outside the realm of
constitutional rights and within the context of the INA itself reveals
two main inconsistencies between section 212(e) and other
136. See infra Part III.A (suggesting introduction of a bona fide marriage
exception).
137. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950)
(“Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an
alien denied entry is concerned.”); see also Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,
345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (same) (quoting Knauff, 338 U.S. at 544).
138. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
139. See id. at 758 (reciting the facts of the case).
140. See id. at 766.
141. See id. at 784 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
142. See id. at 770. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall argued that despite
the congressional plenary power over immigration, the proper standard of review is
strict scrutiny because the power to conduct foreign affairs and immigration is
limited by the Bill of Rights. See id. at 783 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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provisions of the INA. First, section 212(e) defeats the family unity
goals of immigration law.143
Second, unlike the adjudication
processes for other hardship waivers under the INA,144 section 212(e)
waivers are reviewed not by one, but by two agencies, one of which,
the USIA, vetoes waivers even if hardship is present.145
1.

Family unity in the context of immigration law
Like the Supreme Court,146 Congress recognizes the importance of
family unity, which is a constitutionally protected right.147 In the
immigration context, Congress follows the principle that keeping
families united is a fundamental value.148
Immigration law
acknowledges the importance of family unity in the structure of the
immigration system itself.149 For example, immediate relatives, which
include spouses, unmarried children under the age of twenty-one,
and parents of U.S. citizens,150 are all exempt from numerical quotas

143. Compare Hake, supra note 9, at 8 (stating that even if exceptional hardship is
present, the USIA justifies separation of families because of foreign policy
considerations), with E.P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION POLICY 1789-1965, at 505-20 (1981) (stressing family unity as a
consistent goal of immigration law).
144. See infra note 165 (listing other opportunities under the INA for waivers
based on extreme or exceptional hardship).
145. See, e.g., Singh v. Moyer, 867 F.2d 1035, 1037 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that the
INS Regional Commissioner found that exceptional hardship existed but the USIA
nevertheless recommended denial of a waiver); Chong v. USIA, 821 F.2d 171, 174
(3d Cir. 1987) (same).
146. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) (recognizing
family unity as a fundamental right).
147. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 143, at 505-20 (stressing family unity as a
consistent goal of immigrant legislation).
148. Gabor writes that:
The reunification of families serves the national interest not only through
the humaneness of the policy itself, but also through the promotion of the
public order and well-being of the nation. Psychologically and socially, the
reunion of family members with their close relatives promotes the health
and welfare of the United States.
Gabor, supra note 135, at 868-69 (quoting J. Violet, Immigration: Numerical Limits and
the Preference System (Jan. 3, 1989) (CRS Issue Brief)). See generally HUTCHINSON, supra
note 143, at 505-20 (discussing the importance of reunification of family in
immigration law); Daniel Levy, The Family in Immigration and Nationality Law: Part II,
IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, Oct. 1992, at 1 [hereinafter Levy, Part II] (describing ways to
obtain permanent residency through family relationships); Daniel Levy, The Family in
Immigration and Nationality Law: Part I, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, Sept. 1992, at 1
[hereinafter Levy, Part I] (explaining family-based immigration). Gabor also
suggests that the historical objective of the United States of keeping families together
coincides with its international obligations, such as the Code of International
Declaration of Human Rights and Helsinki Final Act, which established that one of
the goals of human rights protection is family reunification. See Gabor, supra note
135, at 868.
149. See generally Levy, Part I, supra note 148, at 1 (reviewing the family-based
immigration system); Levy, Part II, supra note 148, at 1 (same).
150. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. §
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when applying for permanent residency.151 In addition, the INA
establishes first and second preferences152 for applicants for the
numerically limited visas.153 Congress proclaimed the preference for
family immigration on two primary grounds.154 First, this preferential
immigration structure preserves family unity.155 Second, this structure
also promotes family relationships by preventing hardships that
would result to family members if the alien family member had to
wait to enter into the United States, which non-immediate relatives
are required to do.156
Furthermore, in numerous grounds of inadmissibility157 and
deportability,158 i.e., grounds upon which aliens are not admissible for
entry into the United States or may be removed from the United
States,159 Congress provides automatic waivers for aliens who are
married to U.S. citizens and permanent residents.160 The underlying
1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (defining “immediate relatives” as the
spouses, children, or parents of U.S. citizens).
151. See id. § 201(c) (providing that numerical quotas for family-sponsored
immigrants exclude immediate relatives of U.S. citizens). For an explanation of
family-sponsored immigration and the quota system, see LEGOMSKY, supra note 2, at
120-33; and Michael Maggio et al., Immigration Fundamentals for International Lawyers,
13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 857, 876 (1998).
152. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 203(a)(1)-(2) (stating that the first
preference of the family immigration system is for unmarried sons and daughters of
U.S. citizens, and the second preference is for spouses and unmarried sons and
daughters of permanent resident aliens).
153. See id. § 201(c) (providing numerical quotas for aliens subject to the
worldwide level of family-sponsored immigrants).
154. See Meng, supra note 66, at 210.
155. See id. (discussing family unity as the justification for spousal preferences in
immigration law).
156. See id. at 210 n.89 (stating that a primary objective of the immigration system
is the avoidance of immediate family separation) (citing Joe A. Tucker, Assimilation to
the United States: A Study of the Adjustment of Status and Immigration Marriage Fraud
Statutes, 7 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 20, 23 (1989)).
157. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212; supra note 2 and accompanying
text (listing types of grounds for inadmissibility).
158. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 237 (mandating deportation of aliens
who fall within one of the listed classes).
159. For a general explanation of the grounds for inadmissibility and deportability
as well as removal, see generally LEGOMSKY, supra note 2, at 290-91, 374-75.
“Removal” is a collective term for proceedings that were previously called
“deportation” and “exclusion” proceedings of deportable or inadmissible aliens,
respectively. See id. at 291 (defining removal proceedings).
160. “[The] family-oriented priority . . . manifests itself in the fact that many forms
of relief from deportation and exclusion are available only to close relatives of U.S.
citizens and permanent residents.” Austin T. Fragomen & Steven C. Bell, Family
Sponsored Immigration, in BASIC IMMIGRATION LAW, at 59, 61 (PLI Litig. & Admin.
Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7196, 1997), available in WESTLAW, 1001
PLI/Corp. 59.
In the case of a marriage of an alien to a U.S. citizen or permanent resident, the
Attorney General may waive inadmissibility, without any showing of hardship, for the
alien who has a communicable disease of public health significance, including HIV.
See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(g) (waiving the applicability of §
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objective of these automatic waivers is to keep families together,161
which is consistent with the purposes of the INA.162
In the case of exchange students, however, Congress found the
notions of “program concern” and “missionary work”163 more
important than preserving family unity interests.
This harsh
treatment of exchange students is inconsistent with a number of INA
provisions that grant concessions to aliens who enter into good faith
marriages with U.S. citizens and permanent residents, including
those aliens who are otherwise inadmissible or deportable.164
212(a)(1)(A)(i), governing inadmissibility on health-related grounds, in certain
circumstances). Second, section 212(a)(3)(D)(iv) of the INA provides for a similar
waiver if the alien is otherwise inadmissible as an immigrant because he is or has
been a member of or affiliated with the Communist or other totalitarian party. See id.
§ 212(a)(3)(D)(i) (listing membership status in a totalitarian party as grounds for
inadmissibility); id. § 212(a)(3)(D)(iv) (providing for a waiver of inadmissibility for
membership in the Communist Party to assure family unity). Third, an alien who is
inadmissible for document fraud, see id. § 212(a)(6)(F)(i), can obtain a waiver,
subject to certain restrictions, that is available “for humanitarian purposes or to
assure family unity.” See id. § 212(d)(12) (providing for a waiver if certain
qualifications are met). Fourth, an alien who is inadmissible for smuggling another
alien, see id. § 212(a)(6)(E)(i), can be admitted if the alien seeks admission as an
immediate relative, and if the person whom the alien helped to enter the United
States illegally was his or her spouse, parent, son, or daughter at such time. See id. §
212(d)(11) (permitting a waiver to preserve family unity). This last provision
emphasizes the importance of family unity in immigration law in two ways: first, it
punishes the smuggling of immediate family members less stringently, and second, it
provides an exception for those aliens who seek admission as immediate relatives
under section 203(a) of the INA. See id.
In the context of the grounds of deportability, the INA also grants certain
concessions in cases of bona fide marriages of aliens to U.S. citizens and permanent
residents. For example, there is a good faith marriage exception for aliens who
obtained conditional permanent residency by virtue of marriage to a U.S. citizen or
permanent resident, see id. § 216(a), and have not removed the condition in the
statutorily defined term due to termination of that marriage.
See id. §
237(a)(1)(G)(i) (waiving deportability if the alien proves to the Attorney General
that the marriage was not entered into for the purpose of circumventing any
provisions of immigration law); see also id. § 237(a)(1)(E)(ii)-(iii) (providing for a
waiver of deportability in cases of alien smuggling for instances involving family
unification with the purpose of assuring family unity); id. § 237(a)(3)(C)(ii)
(providing for a waiver of deportability for document fraud if the purpose of the
offense was to assist the alien’s spouse or child).
161. See Cerrillo-Perez v. INS, 809 F.2d 1419, 1423 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting the
congressional intent in the INA to preserve family unity between U.S. citizens and
immigrant family members); Hake, supra note 9, at 7 (arguing that the two-year
foreign residency requirement contradicts American history and jurisprudence,
which emphasize the importance of family unity).
162. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) (emphasizing
the significance of family values in American tradition); supra text accompanying
notes 154-56 (discussing that preserving family unity is the goal of immigration law).
163. See 1956 Hearings, supra note 63, at 14-15 (statement of Russell L. Riley,
Director of the Department of State’s International Educational Exchange Service)
(stating that exchange students are to fulfill the “missionary” work upon return to
their home countries).
164. See supra note 160 (describing waivers of other grounds of inadmissibility and
deportability granted in cases of bona fide marriages). Proponents of the
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2.

Inconsistency in the waiver adjudication process
The adjudication process governing waivers of the foreign
residency requirement for exchange visitors is inconsistent with the
other waiver adjudication processes provided for by the INA that also
require a showing of hardship to a U.S. citizen or permanent resident
spouse as a basis for waiving the alien’s inadmissibility or
deportability.165
For example, similar “hardship” language is
exceptional hardship waiver for exchange students argue that the two-year foreign
residency requirement causes a temporary separation which many families face in
life, unlike other grounds of inadmissibility. See Chen v. Attorney Gen., 546 F. Supp.
1060, 1067 (D.D.C. 1982) (discussing the INS argument that temporary separation,
elected by one family member, does not constitute exceptional hardship under
section 212(e) of the INA). Proponents of this standard further argue that the
inadmissibility is overcome easily by simply residing in the foreign country for two
years. Cf. id. (criticizing the INS Commissioner’s position that hardships can be
easily overcome if the family resides abroad for two years). The INA, however,
contains a ground for inadmissibility that is quite similar to that found in section
212(e) of the INA, but which, unlike section 212(e), favors family unity in cases of
bona fide marriage. Under section 204(g) of the INA, an alien who marries a U.S.
citizen or permanent resident during deportation proceedings does not receive
immediate relative status, see Immigration and Nationality Act § 201(b)(2)(A)(i),
“until the alien has resided outside the United States for a 2-year period beginning after the date
of marriage.” Id. § 204(g) (emphasis added in part and original in part). This ground
for inadmissibility has a corresponding waiver provision for good faith marriages:
section 204(g) can be waived if the alien shows by clear and convincing evidence that
“the marriage was entered into in good faith and . . . not entered into for the
purpose of procuring the alien’s admission as an immigrant and no fee or other
consideration was given . . . .” Id. § 245(e)(3). Section 212(e) of the INA poses a
similar hardship of separation for two years for U.S. citizens and permanent residents
from their inadmissible spouses. Unlike section 245(e)(3), however, the foreign
residency requirement of section 212(e) ignores the interests of family unity by
requiring a showing of exceptional hardship to U.S. citizens or permanent resident
spouse before the family unity can be preserved. See id. § 212(e).
165. There are other extreme or exceptional hardship standards in the INA. First,
a showing of “extreme hardship” to a U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouse or
child is required before the alien spouse can obtain a waiver of the following grounds
of inadmissibility: (1) a crime involving moral turpitude, see id. § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I),
(2) multiple criminal convictions for which the imposed sentence was five years or
more, see id. § 212(a)(2)(B), (3) prostitution or commercialized vice, see id.
§ 212(a)(2)(D), (4) certain aliens involved in serious criminal offenses, see id. §
212(a)(2)(E), and (5) a violation or attempt to violate laws of the United States or
another country pertaining to a controlled substance, with certain exceptions, see id.
§ 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). The INA requires a showing of extreme hardship to waive
these grounds of inadmissibility. See id. § 212(h)(1)(B). Second, a showing of
“extreme hardship” to a U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouse, son, or daughter
is required to waive three and ten-year bars for admission for aliens who have been
unlawfully present in the United States for more than 180 days and over a year,
respectively. See id. § 212(a)(9)(B)(v). Third, aliens who are inadmissible for fraud
or willful misrepresentation of a material fact when obtaining a visa for admission
into the United States, see id. § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), can obtain a waiver on the
ground that “extreme hardship” to a U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouse, son,
or daughter will result if the alien is not admitted. See id. § 212(i). Fourth, as a relief
from removal, see LEGOMSKY, supra note 2, at 291, an alien can obtain cancellation of
removal, see infra notes 166-68 and accompanying text, if he or she establishes that
removal will result in an “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a U.S.
citizen or permanent resident spouse or child. See Immigration and Nationality Act §
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encountered in the cancellation of removal section of the INA.166
Cancellation of removal, which is a relief from deportation, is similar
to the section 212(e) hardship waiver.167 Under cancellation of
removal, however, the alien must prove only to the INS that the
hardship is sufficient.168
Adjudication of section 212(e) hardship waivers, on the other
hand, involves an additional agency, the USIA, that has the power to
veto such waivers.169 In comparison, no additional agency is part of
the adjudication process for granting extreme and exceptional
hardship waivers in cancellation of removal cases.170 Requiring the
concurrence of an additional agency makes obtaining a waiver harder
for exchange students than for other inadmissible aliens.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS: A BONA FIDE MARRIAGE EXCEPTION
Section 212(e) of the INA leaves U.S. citizen or permanent
resident spouses of exchange students with two constitutionally
inadequate choices: either remain in the United States and forego
the fundamental right to family unity,171 or move to a foreign country
to be with their alien spouses, foregoing the constitutional right to
reside in the United States.172 The progressive changes in the
international political climate make the governmental interest in
ensuring that exchange students return to their home countries less
important.173 As discussed above,174 section 212(e) of the INA is no
240A(b)(1)(D).
166. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 240A(b)(1)(A)-(D) (providing relief
from removal proceedings for certain permanent residents upon meeting the
threshold showing of hardship and several other requirements).
167. Compare id. (allowing deportable aliens to remain in the United States upon a
showing of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a U.S. citizen or
permanent resident spouse or child in case of deportation of the alien), with id. §
212(e) (allowing inadmissible aliens to remain in the U.S. upon a showing of
exceptional hardship).
168. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(A)(b)(1)(A)-(D) (listing
requirements to qualify for the waiver provision pertaining to removal). For further
reading on the cancellation of deportation, or removal, see William C.B.
Underwood, Note, Unreviewable Discretionary Justice: The New Extreme Hardship in
Cancellation of Deportation Cases, 72 IND. L.J. 885 (1997), which discusses and analyzes
the procedural effects of the cancellation of removal provision.
169. See Silverman v. Rogers, 437 F.2d 102, 107 (1st Cir. 1970) (upholding the
USIA’s veto power in the hardship waiver process).
170. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
171. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the Supreme Court’s recognition of family
unity as a fundamental right protected by the Constitution).
172. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the fundamental right of U.S. citizens to
reside in the United States).
173. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing that the collapse of the Soviet Union has
diminished the governmental interest in exchange programs).
174. See supra Part II.A.3 (suggesting that the foreign residency requirement fails
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longer closely tailored to the foreign policy objectives advanced by
Congress over two decades ago, and thus, fails the strict scrutiny
test.175 Finally, section 212(e) is inconsistent with the family unity
preferences imbedded in immigration law.176 Therefore, Congress
should re-evaluate the two-year foreign residency requirement as it
applies to exchange students married to U.S. citizens or permanent
residents and create a bona fide marriage exception in such cases.
If exchange students who marry U.S. citizens or permanent
residents during their stay are allowed to remain in the United States
after expiration of the exchange program, the supplemental interest
of promoting educational cooperation already would be met.
Further, the proposed bona fide marriage exception in such cases
would be narrow since the overwhelming majority of exchange
students do not marry U.S. citizens or permanent residents during
their participation in exchange programs, or thereafter.177
The legislative history of the two-year foreign residency
requirement reveals that the proponents of this requirement
advanced two principal arguments as to why a bona fide marriage
exception should not be adopted. Both contentions are or can be
resolved by means other than the current, harsh, exceptional
hardship standard imposed in the waiver adjudication process for
exchange students.
The first argument is that the creation of a bona fide marriage
exception will encourage exchange students simply to marry a U.S.
citizen or permanent resident to obtain an immigrant visa.178 As one
legislator commented, he frequently did not see “too much love
involved in [those] marriages.”179 At the time the two-year foreign
strict scrutiny).
175. See supra Part II.A.3 (asserting that the foreign policy objective relevant to
section 212(e) of the INA is outdated, thus obviating the governmental interest in
returning students to their national countries).
176. See supra Part II.B (discussing the preferences of the INA provided for
immediate relatives of U.S. citizens and permanent residents to ensure family unity).
177. For example, in 1995, hardship waiver applications constituted only five
percent of the total number of waiver applications. See Letter from USIA, supra note
26, at 6 (discussing exceptional hardship waiver exceptions and relevant statistics for
1995). The low number of waiver applications that are based on extreme hardship
to the citizen or permanent resident spouse can be explained by a possibly low
number of marriages of exchange students to U.S. citizens and permanent residents.
178. See 1956 Hearings, supra note 63, at 25 (statement of Sen. Hickenlooper)
(expressing concern over inducements to get married if the requirement is not
imposed in cases of marriage).
179. See id. (statement of Sen. Hickenlooper) (advancing the proposition that an
exchange student might not only get married to avoid the requirement, but also
intentionally have a baby specifically to avoid the foreign residency requirement); id.
at 17 (statement of Sen. Wiley) (expressing concern that an exception will be an
inducement for people to get married); see also S. REP. NO. 84-1608, at 3 (1956),
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residency requirement was debated as well as in later years, this
argument was consistent with the INS’ long-standing concern that
marriage fraud was commonplace.180 This concern over marriage
fraud ultimately led to the enactment of the Marriage Fraud
Amendments of 1986181 (“Amendments”). The Amendments provide
certain procedural safeguards to ensure that the marriages between
aliens and U.S. citizens or permanent residents are not contracted,
such as, the conditional permanent resident status for the alien
spouse during the first two years of marriage.182 This conditional
permanent resident status is granted to the alien for two years, but is
contingent upon a valid marriage for those two years.183 The
Amendments provide better methods to combat sham marriages
without disrupting the bona fide marriages of exchange students to
U.S. citizens or permanent residents.
The second argument proffered to support the two-year foreign
residency requirement is that participation in the exchange programs
requires good faith performance by the exchange students of their
obligation, and returning to their home countries is part of that
obligation.184 To view the exchange visitor programs otherwise means
ill-spent money.185 The proponents of the requirement further argue
that both spouses know of this requirement at the inception of
marriage and, thus, exchange students still should be required to

reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2662, 2664 (“[T]he exchange program is not an
immigration program and should not be used to circumvent the operation of the
immigration laws.”).
180. Cf. Nancy K. Richins, Comment, The Marriage Viability Requirement: Is it
Viable?, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 89, 93-94 (1980) (discussing legislation and case law
that clearly granted the INS significant discretion to reject preference applications
that it concluded were premised on sham marriages, i.e., marriages not entered into
in good faith).
181. See Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639,
100 Stat. 3537 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (passing these
amendments to the INA for the purpose of deterring “immigration-related marriage
fraud and other immigration fraud”).
182. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 216, 8 U.S.C. § 1186(a) (1994 & Supp.
III 1997) (providing that conditional permanent resident status shall be terminated
upon a finding of improper marriage).
183. See id. For a critical review of the amendments, see generally Charles
Gordon, The Marriage Fraud Act of 1986, 4 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 183 (1990), which
criticizes many provisions of the Amendments as unnecessary, but stipulating that the
“sham marriage” provision in the amendments is not unreasonable.
184. See 1956 Hearings, supra note 63, at 24-25 (statement of Sen. Hickenlooper)
(“If a person gets married, there is some responsibility on the contracting
parties . . . . They should take into account all the inhibitions and prohibitions and
things that they are up against.”).
185. See 102 CONG. REC. 8563 (1956) (statement of Rep. Judd) (stating that the
exchange student should render the service for which he was brought to the United
States before the United States takes him back).
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fulfill the exchange visitor mission faithfully.186 The concern over illspent money, however, can be overcome if Congress requires
exchange students who enter into good faith marriages to repay the
money expended by the United States for their participation in the
exchange programs.187 The possibility of paying a fine would allow
the exchange students and their spouses to choose whether to
comply with the requirement or to remain in the United States, and
would allow the U.S. government to recoup its investment in the
foreign policy program.
CONCLUSION
This Comment argues that the two-year foreign residency
requirement of section 212(e) of the INA should not be imposed on
alien exchange students who marry U.S. citizens or permanent
residents in good faith. The governmental interest in instituting
exchange programs was to send missionaries to developing countries.
This governmental interest has become outdated with the change in
world politics.
Since the governmental interest in returning
exchange students to their home countries is no longer compelling,
section 212(e) is an infringement upon the fundamental right to
keep family together afforded to U.S. citizens and permanent
residents and the right to reside in the United States afforded to U.S.
citizens. Therefore, the foreign residency requirement fails the strict
scrutiny test. This Comment concludes that the foreign residency
requirement is inconsistent with numerous privileges afforded to
family unity in other contexts of immigration law. Thus, Congress
should enact an exception to the foreign residency requirement
imposed upon former exchange visitors in cases of bona fide
marriages of such visitors to U.S. citizens and permanent residents.

186. See id. (arguing that the two-year foreign residency requirement will
discourage those prospective students who wish to use the program as an avenue for
gaining permanent U.S. residence “from coming[] in the first instance”); supra notes
21-27 and accompanying text (describing that Congress was expecting exchange
students to become emissaries of U.S. policy).
187. Charging a “fine” for violation of conditions of status is not a novelty in
immigration law. Section 245(i)(1) of the INA, which expired on November 14,
1997, provided that aliens who have stayed in the United States without being
admitted (formerly, without inspection), and those who stayed after the expiration of
their stay, could, upon the payment of a $1,000 fine, apply for the adjustment of such
status to that of a lawful permanent resident if no other bar existed and an
immigrant visa were available. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 245(i)(1).

